Assad’s Fall in Syria Might Keep the American Military in Iraq
Numerous Iraqi factions are now starting to have second thoughts about the U.S. drawdown.
The United States of America has maintained some degree of military presence ever since March 19, 2003, when the Iraq War, aka Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), kicked off in order to overthrow then-strongman Saddam Hussein. Even after the Iraq War officially ended in 2011, U.S. troops have maintained at least a nominal presence in the country, a presence whose sense of urgency was given a new lease on life by Operation Inherent Resolve, the fight against the Islamic State terrorist group.
In January 2024, Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani (who assumed office in October 2022) publicly called for a “quick and orderly negotiated exit” of U.S-led coalition forces from the country, a desire shared by many of his countrymen. Indeed, the United States and Iraq ended up signing an agreement to wind down the American military mission by September 2025.
However, the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria has turned the world upside down within the Middle East: numerous Iraqi factions are now starting to have second thoughts about the U.S. drawdown.
American Forces Staying in Iraq?
The basics of the story come to us courtesy of Associated Press (AP) reporters Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Abby Sewell in a January 31, 2025, article published in The Washington Times: ”Regime change in Syria has Iraqi factions backtracking on push for U.S. withdrawal.” To wit:
“When the agreement was reached to end the coalition’s mission in Iraq, Iraqi political leaders said the threat of [the Islamic State] IS was under control and they no longer needed Washington’s help to beat back the remaining cells … But the fall of Assad in a lightning offensive led by Sunni Islamist rebels in December led some to reassess that stance, including members of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of mainly Shiite, Iran-allied political parties … The fall of Assad – an ally of Iran – weakened Tehran’s hand in the region, leaving allied groups in Iraq feeling vulnerable. Many in Iraq also fear that IS could take advantage of the security vacuum to stage a comeback while Syria’s new leaders are still consolidating their control over the country and forming a national army.”
The article goes on to quote an anonymous source within the Iraqi National Security Service (INSS) who said, “The loud voices that were previously talking about the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq have decreased significantly,” he said. “I expect that there will be no withdrawal this year by the Americans.” Meanwhile, a senior U.S. defense official, also speaking on condition of anonymity, corroborated the INSS source’s statement by noting that Iraqi government officials have asked “informally at the highest of levels” for a delay in U.S. withdrawal.
As to the notion of a formal written request for a delay in American troop withdrawal, well, there’s the rub. Al-Sudani might be reluctant to do so publicly out of fear of being depicted by domestic rivals as backing down after his aforementioned, impassioned calls for the U.S. exit.
Moreover, the government of Iraq has always tried to maintain a delicate balance between its ties to Iran (bearing in mind that those two nations have a majority Shia Muslim populace whilst Sunni Islam comprises the majority of the Muslim world as a whole) and to the United States. Moreover, Iraq’s paramilitary units such as the Popular Mobilization Forces have also had a complicated relationship with U.S. forces, with the same groups sometimes attacking the Americans and on other occasions becoming allies of convenience in a fight against a common foe (“the enemy of my enemy is my friend“).
The Way Forward?
The fear, uncertainty, and doubt being felt by the pro-Iranian factions within Iraq runs parallel with a growing sense of paranoia and insecurity within the Iranian regime itself.
That sense of insecurity stems from internal and external factors alike: internal factors such as assassinations in Iran and external factors such as the failure of Iranian proxies like Hezbollah and U.S. president Donald Trump’s February 4, 2025 executive order reviving his “maximum pressure” campaign against the Iranian regime.
As a quick personal side note, last October, I had the honor and pleasure of meeting with Nazar Al Khirullah, ambassador of the Republic of Iraq to the United States. Whilst he asked me to not share the nitty-gritty details of our conversation—carried out over good strong Iraqi coffee within the luxurious confines of his embassy—I am at liberty to say in a general sense that he expressed a strong desire for a continued productive relationship between our two countries. If this latest report from the AP is any indication, he just might get his wish.
About the Author: Christian D. Orr
Christian D. Orr was previously a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ) and 19FortyFive. He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.
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